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Do economic conditions influence union activism behaviour? 
 
Abstract 
This article develops and tests the theory that union activism is related to economic conditions using a 
nationally representative panel of workers from the UK. Results suggest that a fall in real wages of two 
percentage points and a three percentage point increase in the unemployment rate are both associated 
with a one tenth increase in the probability that a ‘benchmark’ worker will become a union activist (albeit 
from a low base). This relationship is largely explained by the behaviour of workers in highly unionised 
sectors. 
 
Introduction  
For industrial democracy to flourish, it is necessary for workers to participate in the bodies and 
organisations that represent them. With this in mind, this article aims to advance understanding of the 
conditions that encourage workers to participate in trade unions; this is also important because union 
activism is a form of collective human agency which has played a historically significant role in 
determining the practices and processes that shape conditions and relations at work. Further, trade unions 
rely on the voluntary unpaid activism of their members to function and remain viable (Willman and 
Bryson, 2007; Willman, et al. 1993) so union activism is a crucial determinant of union effectiveness (Gall 
and Fiorito 2014). While there is a large research literature examining the psychological antecedents of 
union activism, this literature does little to further understanding of the role of material economic, social 
and workplace factors in shaping activism behaviour (Gall and Fiorito, 2012). This omission is significant 
as it seems likely that much union activism, like union membership, is a response to dissatisfaction with 
bread and butter issues (Kochan, 1979; Nicholson et al., 1981; Stepina and Fiorito, 1986). This article 
aims to begin remedying this deficiency. 
 Specifically, we draw on business cycle theories of union behaviour derived from Commons 
(1910) and related empirical tests of the relationship between economic variables, union membership and 
strikes to develop middle range theory and testable hypotheses about how macro-economic conditions 
might shape union activism behaviour. Then we theorise the micro-level mechanisms that might explain 
how macro-economic conditions affect individual level activism behaviour and develop hypotheses to test 
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this theory. Our empirical analysis uses the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a nationally 
representative panel survey covering a 16 year period. The BHPS asks respondents whether they were 
‘active in a trade union or staff association’. The longitudinal nature of the data allow us to use panel 
econometric techniques to take into account and control for time invariant aspects of personality that 
might also shape activism behaviour.  
 
The incidence and determinants of union activism: existing theory and evidence 
Note first that union activism is conditional on membership, so correlated with, but distinct from it. 
Membership and activism can be conceived as different behaviours related to a continuum of attitudes 
towards unions, from outright hostility to strong emotional commitment. Definitions of union activism 
vary; different measures include different lists of activities that are considered as activism behaviours, 
some defining it very broadly in terms of simply attending meetings and participating in elections, reading 
documents and discussing union activities with co-workers, others as measures of willingness to work for 
a union, including more time intensive behaviours such as taking on a representative role or holding 
elected union office (Fiorito et al., 2014: 4). The most recent comprehensive survey of union activism 
dates from the 2005 – 2006 World Values Survey, which found that 52 per cent of union members in 
Britain reported that they were active in their trade union – a figure closely comparable to equivalent 
results from the USA and Canada, although other sources of evidence suggest activism levels are far 
lower, a difference probably attributable to the different definitions of activism used (Fiorito et al., 2014: 
4).  
There is an extensive literature on the psychological antecedents of union commitment. 
Willingness to work for a union, an indicator of activism, is included in the most commonly used measure 
of union commitment (that of Gordon et al.., 1980) so it is unsurprising that longitudinal studies suggest 
that union commitment has a causal relationship with union activism (Fullager and Barling, 1989; Fullager 
et al.., 2004). However, most studies of union commitment are based on cross-sectional samples of a 
single occupation or workplace. Consequently, consistent and robust findings are rare. One meta-analysis 
has found that pro-union attitudes were a strong predictor of union commitment, with perceived union 
instrumentality acting as a weaker predictor (Bamberger et al., 1999). Another meta-analysis found that 
4 
 
there is relationship between job satisfaction and union commitment, which is moderated by the 
industrial relations climate, with a negative relationship where the industrial relations climate is poor and a 
positive relationship when the industrial relations climate is good (Fuller and Hester, 1998). What is 
missing from these studies is any evidence or analysis of how contextual factors, like material living and 
working conditions shape union commitment and activism (Gall and Fiorito, 2012: 199; Sverke and 
Kuruvilla, 1995).  
A second significant limitation of the union commitment literature is its focus on attitudinal (or 
affective) commitment to unions, which is conceptually distinct from calculative or instrumental 
commitment (Snape et al., 2000: 216). This partial focus is significant because Nicholson and his 
colleagues (1981) suggest that a simple dichotomy between activists and non-activists is unhelpful, and 
instead posit that there is a continuum of member types, from passive dues payers through to ideological 
activists. They identify three specific types who are likely to participate in union activism: selective 
activists, apolitical stalwarts and ideological activists. Of these they argue, the selective activists, who 
participate in union activism for instrumental reasons constitute both the largest group of union members 
and the largest group who could be considered activists. This group may be beyond the purview of the 
union commitment literature because, in contrast to the apolitical stalwarts and ideological activists, they 
are not (primarily) active as a result of affective commitment. In order to overcome this limitation, it is 
necessary to incorporate insights from economics, sociology and industrial relations. Specifically, there is 
a body of theory and evidence which suggests that union behaviour is influenced by economic factors and 
economistic concerns. The next section will outline this theory and develop testable hypotheses 
 
Trade union activism and the business cycle: theory and hypotheses 
The idea that the business cycle has a role in shaping the union behaviour of employees originated with 
Commons (1910) who argued that inflation acts as a spur for employees to organize themselves into 
unions and to go on strike in order to protect their living standards from erosion. At the same time, 
employers have an incentive to give in to employee demands quickly during boom conditions that often 
cause inflation, because they do not want costly interruptions to production or service delivery. 
Conversely, during downturns employers are better able to resist unions because employers can run down 
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accumulated inventory during interruptions to production. Empirical research suggests that the business 
cycle affects different aspects of union behaviour in different ways. 
Empirical support for Commons’ theory comes from analysis of aggregate time-series data on 
union membership density in the USA (Ashenfelter and Pencavel, 1969), Great Britain (Disney, 1990; 
Carruth and Disney, 1988; Booth, 1983; Bain and Elsheikh, 1976; Hines 1964), Australia and Sweden 
(Bain and Elsheikh, 1976). However, these models were unable to predict the sustained decline in union 
membership after 1980 (Western, 1995), leading Carruth and Disney to argue that it was the rate of real 
wage growth, not the business cycle per se, which determined union membership, with employees having 
less incentive to unionise when real wage growth is positive (Carruth and Disney, 1988, Disney, 1990). 
There is also evidence that strike incidence and duration is affected by the business cycle, with a higher 
number of short strikes during boom periods of high inflation and a smaller number of long strikes as 
workers resists redundancies, restructuring and work intensification during downturns (Devereux and 
Hart, 2011; Franzosi, 1995; 1989; McConnell, 1990; Harrison and Stewart, 1989; Kennan, 1985). 
This evidence has not won over sceptics, who have argued that some of the hypotheses derived 
from Commons’ theory appear arbitrary. The reasons for adopting the particular model specification 
which results in successful predictions of membership or strike activity are not always clear, nor is it clear 
precisely how macro-economic conditions affect the micro-level behaviour of individuals (Fiorito, 1982; 
Richardson, 1977). The theoretical approach appears blind to issues of politics and power (Franzosi, 
1989; Hyman, 1971). The lack of consistency in results over time and across different countries (Western, 
1995) suggests that at best causal mechanisms are contingent on a specific institutional and political 
environment and that at worst results are merely the result of statistical chance.  
Goldthorpe (2001) has argued that results like those found in studies of the union/business cycle 
relationship should be treated as provisional until the generative mechanisms underpinning them can be 
identified more precisely through further research. We are aware of two studies that provide support for 
business cycle theory by identifying underlying generative mechanisms while at the same time qualifying 
the theory by demonstrating the limits of its explanatory powers. Franzosi’s seminal study of strikes in 
Italy demonstrates how the business cycle influenced the behaviour of workers, unions and employers in 
ways predicted by Commons, while also showing that employers and the state changed policy and 
6 
 
behaviour as a result, so that the relationships between the business cycle and strike activity changed over 
time (Franzosi, 1995). Machin and his colleagues (1995) demonstrated that British employer decisions to 
recognise unions, and by extension union membership, were related to the business cycle via the 
mechanism of product market competition at the time an enterprise was established. However, this 
relationship ceased to operate following the election of the Conservative Government in 1979, a finding 
compatible with Franzosi’s argument that state and employer strategies change in response to the ways 
that workers and unions react to the business cycle. 
Overall then theory and evidence suggests that economic variables that change with the business 
cycle have a role in influencing the union behaviour of workers, although this relationship is not as simple 
or straightforward as some of the early empirical studies based on analysis of aggregate time series data 
implied. From this we might infer that changes in economic variables might influence workers’ union 
activism behaviour, because cycles of workplace restructuring and the level of employers pay offers 
relative to inflation will be somewhat related to changes in economic conditions, and these factors 
influence workers’ incentives to participate in union activism. However, contradictions between findings 
in the research discussed above mean that a number of competing hypotheses can be developed: 
First, Commons (1910) argued that union activity would rise during booms when inflation was 
high and rising, as workers looked to unions to protect wages from erosion. H1: union activism will be 
positively associated with rising inflation. 
Second, Disney (1990) modified this argument in the light of his own empirical findings from 
Britain to argue that it was changes to real wage growth, not changes to the rate of inflation which 
determined union behaviour, with union membership (and by extension other forms of union activity) 
falling when real wage growth was strong, because workers had no incentive to engage in union activity. 
H2: union activism will be negatively associated with real wage growth. 
Third, Commons (1910) argued that union membership falls when unemployment rises as union 
workers are laid off and employers are better able to resist workers claims, so the incentives to engage in 
union activity fall. Given the overlap between activism and membership, the same incentives may 
negatively affect propensities to engage in union activism. H3: union activism will be negatively associated 
with rising unemployment. 
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Fourth, on the other hand, Franzosi’s research into strike patterns suggests that the number of 
long strikes increases when unemployment rises, because workers resist managerial attempts to 
restructure and downsize. Although the incentives for non-union workers to unionise fall, already 
unionised workers may face increased incentives to act collectively to resist managerially initiated changes 
that they dislike. It may therefore be the case that the restructuring and downsizing associated with 
periods of unemployment leads to increased activism. This suggests a hypothesis that directly contradicts 
H3: therefore H4: union activism will be positively associated with rising unemployment. 
Following the approach to quantitative sociological analysis outlined by Goldthorpe (2001), the 
simple appearance of an association between macro-economic variables and union activism (falsifying the 
null hypothesis that there is no relationship) is not enough to confirm the plausibility of the underlying 
theory. It is also necessary to identify the individual level mechanisms that generate the behaviour. 
Individual level panel data like that provided by the BHPS is ideally suited for this more fine-grained 
analysis.  
Drawing on the ideas of Bain and Elsheikh (1976), theoretically, we can think of two types of 
measure that might explain how macro-economic conditions influence micro-behaviour. First, measures 
of the workers’ individual economic position: wage levels, personal financial circumstances, satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the extrinsic aspects of a job. Essentially, these measures alter workers perceptions of 
the costs and benefits of union activism for the individual, either making it appear more or less costly, or 
increasing or reducing the potential benefits of activism activity. Second, measures that act as proxies for 
the institutions of industrial relations at a workplace level: whether the respondent lives in an area of the 
country where unions have traditionally been strong (Beynon et al., 2012), whether the respondent works 
in a sector or industry with a relatively high level of unionisation. Workers in highly unionised workplaces 
with traditions of collective action will be more likely to respond to changes in their personal economic 
circumstances through union activism than workers in workplaces without a union, because organisation 
and leadership is needed if individual complaints are to be framed as collective grievances and workers 
persuaded to participate in collective action (Kelly, 1998; Stepina and Fiorito 1986), and high union 
density creates social norms which make engagement with the union more likely (Toubǿl and Jensen, 
2014). Empirically, we will see evidence of how macro-economic conditions affect individual behaviour if 
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the effects of the macro-economic variables become smaller and non-significant after controls for 
individual economic position and/or proxies for industrial relations institutions are added to the 
econometric model. There is no strong theoretical prior for thinking that one or other of these groups of 
measures will have the most important role in explaining the activism/economic variable relationship. 
Therefore we predict: 
H5: The relationship between of the macro-economic conditions and union activism will become smaller 
and non-significant after measures that capture the effects of these conditions on individuals’ economic 
position are added to the model, and/or H6: The relationship between macro-economic conditions and 
union activism will become smaller and statistically insignificant after measures that capture institutions of 
industrial relations at the workplace are added to the model. 
 
Data and methods 
The BHPS began in 1991 with a stratified random population sample comprising residents of 5,538 
households aged 16 and over (see Taylor et al., 2010). When a survey participant leaves a household an 
attempt is made to track them into their new household, which then joins the survey. Similarly, new 
persons who join a sample household, including new children, are added to the sample. Thus, with the 
exception of new immigrants who arrive in the country after the study commenced, the survey should 
remain broadly representative of the population from which it is drawn. A further 2,887 households from 
Scotland and Wales were added to the survey in 1999 and a further 1,979 households from Northern 
Ireland were added in 2001. At least one adult member at 74% of all in-scope selected households agreed 
to an interview at wave one. The annual re-interview rates for the main sample, average around 95%.  
 
Union activism 
The BHPS included a measure of union activism annually in the 1991 – 95 waves of the survey, and bi-
annually after that, with the activism question included in 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007. The 
question about union activism does not distinguish between different forms of activity, asking simply 
whether respondents are “active in a trade union” (the question is asked alongside questions about 
activism in other types of voluntary and civil society groups). While it would be desirable to be able to 
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unpack the different types of behaviour and activity associated with self-reported activism, we believe that 
this simple, self-defined measure of activism is sufficient for the purposes of this paper. Activism is a 
commonly used and widely understood term, so BHPS respondents will be well placed to decide whether 
they are active in a union or not. Further, recent evidence from a faculty union in North America suggests 
that this type of measure is reasonably well correlated with more behaviourally orientated indicators of 
activism (Fiorito et al., 2014: 11 – 12). However, understandings of what constitutes activism may vary 
between survey respondents, so this will inevitably introduce some measurement error to our analysis. 
The effects of such measurement error is typically to bias the results of empirical analysis downwards. 
Figure one graphs the responses to this question over the course of the BHPS. 
 
Figure 1 around here. 
 
Figure 1 reports three sets of results, the first are un-weighted on an unbalanced panel, the 
second are weighted with cross-sectional weights on an unbalanced panel. The third are weighted with 
longitudinal weights on a balanced panel (i.e. those respondents who participated in all waves of the 
survey). Looking at the weighted results on the unbalanced panel, approximately 5.3 per cent of 
employees described themselves as activists in 1991, rising to a high point of 6.6 per cent in 1995, before 
declining. Decline was arrested between 2001 and 2003, before dropping to 3.9 per cent in 2007. Note 
that these results relate to the percentage of employees who describe themselves as union activists, if we 
were to look at the percentage of union members (figure 2) we see a slightly different picture. This shows 
that around 17 per cent of members described themselves as activists in 1991, rising to around 23 per 
cent in 1995, falling back to around 17 per cent by 2007. 
 
Insert figure 2 around here. 
 
If people tend to remain activists once they make the initial decision to become activists (as is the case 
with union membership) it is highly unlikely that macro-economic variables will explain union activism, 
because changes in economic variables will not explain unchanging behaviour by individuals. In fact, 
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figure three (which graphs the transitions into and out of activism status) shows that activism is a highly 
transitory state. Overall, just 0.16 of BHPS respondents classified themselves as union activists 
throughout the period 1991 – 2007, with 16.51 per cent of the balanced panel who were in employment 
in at least one wave reporting that they considered themselves to be union activists at some point.  
 
Figure 3 around here. 
 
Macro-economic indicators 
The aggregate measures of inflation, unemployment and real wage growth used in our analysis are 
reported in table 1, along with annual GDP growth (which is included in the table to provide context).  
 
Insert table 1 around here 
 
Individual level indicators of the likely perceived costs and benefits of activism  
To investigate whether there are plausible mechanisms to explain the relationship between activism and 
macro-economic variables our analysis includes both objective and subjective indicators of the economic 
circumstances of survey respondents, which may alter the calculus of the costs and benefits to activism. 
First, the hourly wage variable included in the dataset was deflated by the retail price index measure of 
inflation, to 1991 levels for all waves of the survey. Then we estimated a human capital type equation, 
where the natural logarithm of hourly wages are seen as being determined by an individual’s gender, age 
(entered as a continuous variable) and age squared, relationship status, highest educational qualification 
achieved (no qualifications, high school level qualifications, advanced high school level qualifications, a 
university degree or a higher university degree), the sector (public private or voluntary), occupation 
(measured at the 1 digit SOC90 level) and industry (measured at the 1 digit SIC92 level) and the region in 
which the individual is resident. A predicted log wage for each individual was then generated from the 
model results, and the predicted log wage was subtracted from the actual log wage. The resulting value 
was then entered into the model as an independent variable. If actual log wages are lower than predicted, 
the worker may have a stronger incentive to activism to close the gap with other workers with similar 
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skills and experience. Alternatively, higher than predicted log wages may be an indicator of a union wage 
premium with the measure effectively acting as an indicator of union power at the respondent’s 
workplace, sector or industry, so reflecting a higher propensity to activism.  
Second, we estimated a similar human capital equation on the determinants of wage change 
(where the dependent variable was log of hourly wages in the previous wave of the survey subtracted 
from current log wages) and derived a predicted wage change from the results. Similarly, we then 
subtracted predicted wage change from the actual wage change and included the results as an independent 
variable. Note that there is a degree of inter-correlation between the two wage related variables (0.387), 
but the inter-correlation is not strong enough to prevent both being included. If wage growth is lower 
than predicted, this may provide an incentive to union activism to try to close the gap. 
Third, the BHPS also includes a measure of the subjective financial circumstances of individual 
respondents, who were asked to report whether they were ‘living comfortably’, ‘doing alright’, ‘just about 
getting by’ or ‘struggling’. Those who are just getting by or struggling may have a stronger incentive to 
activism than those who are comfortable.  
Fourth, following the earlier discussion, the threat of unemployment may act as a disincentive to 
activism, because workers may fear that activism will be punished by employers when making decisions 
about who to make redundant. To capture this potential disincentive, we included a dummy variable 
derived from retrospective work-life history data and responses to earlier waves of the survey to identify 
if the respondent reported having previously experienced being laid off, made redundant or dismissed. 
We expect those with a previous history of involuntary job loss to fear job loss more, so be less likely to 
engage in activism. 
Finally, the BHPS includes measures of job satisfaction, measured on a 7 point scale, where 1 is 
very dissatisfied and 7 is very satisfied, including satisfaction with wages and job security. Those who are 
dissatisfied with wages may have an increased incentive to engage in activism to address the source of 
dissatisfaction, while those who are dissatisfied with job security could either experience increased 
incentives to activism as they try to address insecurity or they may face disincentives related to the fear of 
unemployment. We also included measures of satisfaction with hours worked and with work itself as 
further controls. 
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Job and workplace levels controls 
Control variables were included for whether a job was part-time (<35 hours a week); fixed term or 
temporary in nature; whether there was an active union or staff association at the workplace; whether the 
workplace employed fewer than 25 employees; broad occupation and industry (measured at the 1 digit 
SOC and SIC level respectively); and whether the workplace was in the public or voluntary sectors. It 
might be expected that activism is more common in workplaces with a union, larger workplaces, public 
sector workplaces and workplaces in particular industries with high levels of unionisation (e.g. transport 
and communications).  
 
Individual level controls 
Individual level controls were included for gender, non-white ethnicity, the age of the respondent, 
highest educational qualification, whether or not the respondent lived in the North and Midlands or 
England or Wales or Scotland (union membership and support for trade unions is generally higher in 
these areas of Great Britain than it is in the South and East of England). Controls were also included for 
survey wave. Within the literature, there is also a suggestion that union activity may be related to support 
for political parties of the left (Western, 1995). If this is the case, the pattern of activism identified in 
figure one may simply reflect rising support for the Labour Party prior to 1997 and declining support 
since. Therefore a control for whether the respondent said that they would intend to vote Labour in an 
election was included in the model. The mean values of the independent variables included in our analysis 
are reported in table 2. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Methods 
To test our hypotheses, we begin with a simple cross-sectional logit model that pools data over the 
different years of the survey with the form: 
UAit = α + Xitβ + εit i = 1..., N; t = 1,...., T,    (1) 
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Where UAit is the self-reported activist status of individual i at time t, Xit represents measures of macro-
economic conditions.  To test hypotheses five and six we estimated a second model: 
 
UAit = α + Xitβ + Zit + εit i = 1..., N; t = 1,...., T,    (2) 
 
Where Zit captures the individual levels determinants of union activism identified in the previous section. 
If the addition of Zit to the model has the effects of making the coefficients for Xit smaller and 
insignificant then it suggests that the relationship between macro-economic variables and activism is 
explained by the variables captured by Zit1. The problem with this pooled cross-sectional analysis is that 
results may be biased by omitted variables. Specifically, if any of the variables in our analysis are 
correlated with the (unobserved) values and attitudes that the union commitment literature suggests shape 
union commitment and therefore activism, coefficients will be biased upwards. Given research which 
suggests that values and attitudes are formed in youth and change only slowly (Inglehart, 1977) it seems 
reasonable to assume that values and attitudes towards unions are relatively time invariant. Therefore we 
can use the panel nature of our data to control for time invariant individual characteristics. First, we 
estimate a random effects logit model with the form: 
 
UAit = μ + Xitβ + Zitγ + εit ,        (3) 
 
where μ is the individual specific random effect. This model makes the assumption that the individual 
random effects are not correlated with the independent variables included in the model. If this 
assumption is incorrect, our results will be biased. We can test this by estimating a fixed effects model, 
which allows for the assumption that individual specific effects are correlated with independent variables, 
and comparing the results of the two models using a panel adjusted Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). The 
results of this test suggest that the random effects model was more efficient than the fixed effects, so the 
assumptions of the random effects model are appropriate. Therefore we report the random effects results 
from equation 3 in the results section below.  
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We estimated these models on an un-weighted and unbalanced panel as this maximised the 
observations and information we could include in the analysis. Key results were not sensitive to the 
addition of cross-sectional weights (for the pooled model only) or longitudinal weights on a balanced 
panel. Observations with missing values were excluded from the analysis. We assume that non-response 
to individual items in the survey is a random process, so this should not bias results. Additional sensitivity 
analyses found that our key results were not sensitive to step-wise removal of independent variables and 
associated changes in the sample size. To test whether our results were biased by panel attrition we 
followed the procedure set out by Verbeek and Nijman (1992) by estimating additional models with a 
control for whether a respondent participated in the next wave of the survey. The effects of this attrition 
control were insignificant, suggesting that panel attrition bias was not a significant issue.  
To aid interpretation, results are reported in the form of marginal effects. They can be 
understood as the change in predicted probability of union activism for a benchmark employee with a 
particular set of characteristics if the independent variable in question increases by one. So for example, 
for gender, the marginal effect can be interpreted as the change in probability of union activism if the 
gender of the respondent changed from male to female, but all other characteristics were held constant. 
The predicted probability of activism for the benchmark employee is reported at the bottom of table 3. 
The characteristics of the benchmark employees are reported in table A1 in the appendix.  
 
Results 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Look first at column four of table 3. It shows the relationship between macro-economic variables and 
union activism based on model 1 (above). The national unemployment rate is positively and significantly 
related to activism – this is in line with H4, therefore H3 is falsified. The relationship between inflation 
and activism is negative and insignificant (falsifying H1). However, in line with H2, the relationship 
between real wage growth and activism is negative and significant; employees are less likely to become 
union activists when real wage growth is strong.  
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Turning now to column one of table 3, which shows the equivalent results from a random effects 
logit model. The direction and statistical significance of the results are the same as those from the pooled 
logit model in column four, but the magnitude of the relationships is much smaller, suggesting that the 
pooled logit results are biased upwards as a result of correlation between macro-economic variables and 
individual random effects. Therefore the rest of this section focuses on the random effects results 
reported in columns one, two and three.   
In column two, we add measures of variables that capture the economic position and concerns of 
the individual employees. The addition of these measures actually increases the size of the marginal 
effects for unemployment and real wage growth. Therefore the relationship between activism and macro-
economic variables is not explained by these measures. Looking in detail at the new results, they show 
that employees whose pay is higher than the predicted wage for a worker with the same level of human 
capital (i.e. higher paid employees) are more likely to be union activists. There are two ways of 
interpreting this result. First, employees with higher levels of unobserved human capital may be more 
likely to be active in their union; second, there is a wage premium for employees in highly unionized 
workplaces, where a higher proportion of employees are activists, and this is being picked up by this 
variable. Although there appears to be a wage premium associated with union activism, employees whose 
pay has risen more slowly over the previous 12 months relative to predicted wage growth from a human 
capital equation also more likely to become activists, as were those dissatisfied with their pay; suggesting 
that grievances over pay act as an incentive to activism. The key point which emerges from all three 
results is that there is a relationship between individual pay and union activism.  
Respondents with previous experience of lay-off, redundancy or dismissal were less likely to 
become activists as were those who were dissatisfied with job security, suggesting that while in the 
aggregate, the re-structuring and threat of involuntary job loss that coincides with rising unemployment 
may promote activism, employees who felt themselves to be most at risk felt strong disincentives to 
engage in activism. Similarly, those who felt their personal financial position to be precarious were less 
likely to be activists. Overall, these results suggest that economic insecurity and the direct threat of 
unemployment have a disciplining effect on workers which is a disincentive to activism. 
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In column three, we add a full set of controls for individual and job characteristics2. The addition 
of these variables results in the relationships between macro-economic variables and activism becoming 
smaller and statistically insignificant, supporting hypothesis 6. This suggests that the relationship between 
economic variables and union activism operates through specific groups of workers in jobs and 
workplaces where unions are well organised and there is a tradition of collective action, for example men, 
workers aged 35 and over, in full-time permanent jobs, in skilled manual occupations, in the Midlands or 
North of England, Scotland and Wales, in workplaces where a trade union is present, in the public sector 
and the transport and communications industries. Additional analyses (not reported for reasons of space) 
found that the relationship between activism and macro-economic indicators was seen most strongly in 
the public sector. Even after these controls are added, a number of indicators of individual economic 
circumstances remain statistically significant predictors of activism: the difference between actual and 
predicted wages and actual and predicted wage growth and (dis)satisfaction with pay and job security.  
The variable for intention to vote Labour was not statistically significant in the model with a full set of 
controls.  
Given the small size of the marginal effects in the random effects model, what is the quantitative 
significance of these results? Note first that the predicted probability of being an activist for the ‘baseline 
worker’ derived from the model reported in column (2) of table three is 0.0125. This assumes an 
unemployment rate of 4% and annual real wage growth of 2%. Note second that the marginal effects for 
unemployment and real wage growth can be interpreted as the change associated with a one percentage 
point change in unemployment or wage growth. Therefore, if real wage growth changed from 2% a year 
to -5% a year, the probability of activism for our benchmark individual would rise from 0.0125 to 0.0174 
(a 39% increase). Similarly, if unemployment rose from 4% to 10%, the probability of activism would rise 
from 0.0125 to 0.0149 (a 19% increase). This suggests that falling real wages and rising unemployment 
exert moderate but quantitatively significant effects on workers’ propensities to union activism.   
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
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The starting point for this paper was the conviction that psychological models of the attitudinal 
antecedents union commitment (which closely predict activism) provided only a partial explanation of 
why workers become active in trade unions (Gall and Fiorito, 2012), and that it is necessary to look for 
the role of economic, social and institutional factors too, because these factors would be more likely than 
psychological factors to determine the union behaviour of what Nicholson and colleagues (1981) called 
instrumental activists who become active in response to dissatisfaction with ‘bread and butter’ issues 
related to economic concerns. Drawing on a well-established body of theory, we hypothesised that 
macro-economic conditions might be associated with activism, because they change the incentives for 
workers with regard to union activism. As the empirical literature on this is somewhat contradictory four 
hypotheses about the effects of macro-economic variables were developed. We found support for two of 
them; real wage growth is negatively associated with activism while unemployment is positively associated 
with activism. The magnitude of these effects is quantitatively and statistically significant in that a squeeze 
on real wages comparable to that experienced in Britain since 2008 or an increase in unemployment to the 
level experienced in Britain in the recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s would increase our 
statistically produced benchmark worker’s probability of activism by moderate but quantitatively 
significant amounts (albeit from a low base). This clearly demonstrates that macro-economic conditions 
do influence the union behaviour of workers, but not to anything approaching the extent claimed by 
some of the time series analyses of the business cycle-union membership and business cycle-strikes 
relationships (e.g. Disney, 1990). Further analyses revealed that the relationships were most pronounced 
within the public sector. 
One of the major criticisms levelled against economic theories of union behaviour, is that it is 
not clear how changes in macro-economic conditions change the behaviour of workers at a micro level 
(e.g. Fiorito 1982). Therefore, we went on to investigate whether the effects of macro-economic variables 
were explained by measures of the economic position of the individual worker and proxies for the 
institutions of industrial relations at the workplace level. If the addition of these variables resulted in the 
relationship between economic variables becoming smaller and statistically insignificant, this would 
suggest the channel through which macro conditions affect micro behaviour.  
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Our results suggest that measures of the economic position of the individual employee do have a 
role in determining activism behaviour, with employees more likely to become active if their pay has 
grown more slowly than a standard human capital equation would predict, and if they are dissatisfied with 
pay and job security. Similarly, workers who feel the threat of job loss most keenly, because they have 
previously been made redundant were less likely to be activists. However, the addition of these variables 
did not account for the relationship between activism and macro-economic conditions.  
The addition of controls for job, workplace and individual characteristics, many of which act as 
proxy measures for the institutions of industrial relations at a workplace, sector or industry level largely 
explained the effects of the macro-economic variables. This suggests that macro-economic factors 
influence the probability of being a union activist via the behaviour of particular groups of workers, 
working in the more unionised sectors of the economy with traditions of addressing economic grievances 
through collective action, particularly those in the public sector. This result accords with what 
mobilisation theory (Kelly, 1998) would lead us to expect; for a grievance to become a collective 
grievance addressed through union activism it is necessary for workers to have a collective identity and 
leadership and organisation which frames grievances in collective terms and this would only be present in 
well unionised sectors. Grievances over bread and butter issues only result in union activism if workers 
have the opportunity or ability to become active (Stepina and Fiorito 1986: 251). Given the relatively 
small size of the unionised sector, this helps to explain why the associations between macro-economic 
variables and union activism are not larger. 
Overall then, this study represents a development on the approach to understanding union 
activism found in the psychological literature on union commitment. Longitudinal data have allowed us to 
control for time invariant individual psychological factors found to be important in this literature, while 
allowing us to identify economic and institutional effects on activism not previously identified by 
psychological studies. At the same time, our approach is also an advance on the methods traditionally 
used by economists to investigate the relationship between economic factors and the union behaviour of 
workers, because the use of longitudinal micro-data allow us to identify the mechanisms through which 
macro-economic variables influence individual behaviour, while also reducing the likelihood that results 
will be overstated due to omitted variable bias. Essentially then, our results suggest that there is merit to 
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the theory that macro-economic factors (and economic factors not necessarily closely related to macro-
level changes) influence the union behaviour of workers, however, they also suggest that much of the 
research testing this theory using time series analysis of aggregate data dramatically overstated the size of 
the effects. 
Based on our analysis, we would predict that union activism will have risen since the economic 
crisis of 2008, because British workers have been subjected to a prolonged period of falling real wages at 
the same time as unemployment has risen. Further, we would expect this activism to have been 
concentrated in the more heavily unionised parts of the economy, for example the public sector. 
Although we cannot formally test this prediction, because, regrettably, the BHPS stopped asking the 
question on union activism on which our analysis was based in 2007, evidence from the Workplace 
Employment Relations Study does indeed point to an increase in union activism, particularly in the highly 
unionised public sector (van Wanrooy et al., 2013: 151).  
Finally, these results suggest that union activism is the result of the interplay between structure 
(economic conditions) and the agency of unions themselves; where union have succeeded in building and 
maintaining organisation, workers become active in their unions in response to dissatisfaction with bread 
and butter issues related to the business cycle. This finding is in contrast to the picture that emerged from 
much of the previous literature on unions and the business cycle, which appeared to suggest that the 
union behaviour of workers was a mechanistic reaction to changing economic conditions. On the one 
hand this demonstration of the scope for union agency in promoting activism should be heartening for 
unions. On the other, the challenges to building and sustaining the conditions under which activism 
becomes a viable option for workers given the wider institutional-political-economic structures under 
which union in advanced industrial countries have to operate in remains a formidable challenge, which 
unions all over the world have been struggling to meet for the last thirty years. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. We also tested whether specific measures of personal economic position and workplace 
characteristics which proxy for industrial relations institutions formally mediated the relationships 
between macro-economic variables and activism using the procedure suggested by (Zhao et al., 
2010:204). See note two below for a discussion of results. 
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2. Given the large number of potential mediator variables, it is not feasible to fully report the results of 
formal tests of mediation for these variables. Briefly, results suggested that many of the proxy 
measures of industrial relations institutions partially mediated the relationship between economic 
variables and activism. The joint effect of these variables was then to fully mediate the relationship 
between macro-economic variables and activism.  
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Table 1.  Inflation, unemployment and real wage growth in Great Britain 1991 – 2007. 
 
  
Unemployment 
Rate RPI Inflation 
Real Wage 
Growth GDP Growth 
1991 8.9 5.9 1.9 -1.4 
1992 9.9 3.7 2.2 0.1 
1993 10.4 1.6 1.3 2.2 
1994 9.5 2.4 1.3 4.3 
1995 8.6 3.5 -0.4 3.1 
1996 8.1 2.4 1.2 2.9 
1997 6.9 3.1 1.2 6.2 
1998 6.2 3.4 1.7 3.8 
1999 6 1.5 3.3 3.7 
2000 5.4 3 1.5 4.5 
2001 5.1 1.8 2.6 3.2 
2002 0.2 1.7 1.8 2.7 
2003 5 2.9 0.5 3.5 
2004 4.8 3 1.5 3 
2005 4.9 2.8 1.2 2.1 
2006 5.4 3.2 0.9 2.6 
2007 5.3 4.3 -0.3 3.5 
 
Sources: 
Real wage growth- The percentage change in the average annual wages, including bonuses, of all 
employees net of inflation. Data were provided to the authors by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). 
 
RPI Inflation- Retail Price Index- Provides the measure of inflation based upon the change in price of a 
basket of goods and services including mortgage interest payments, house depreciation and council taxes 
(ONS n.d.a) 
 
Unemployment Rate: The percentage of economically active individuals aged 16 and over who are not in 
employment but are looking for, and able to, work (ONS n.d.b)  
 
GDP Growth: Annual percentage growth rate of Gross Domestic Product - the market value of all 
domestic goods and services produced within a single country, taken at the value of the local currency. 
(Worldbank n.d)  
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Table 2. Mean values of independent variables  
 
 (1) Mean 
(standard deviation) 
(2) Mean 
(standard deviation) 
National Level Statistics 
National Unemployment Rate  
 
Inflation Rate 
 
Real Annual Wage Growth  
 
Voting Preference  
Labour Supporter 
 
Job characteristics 
Actual and Predicted Wage Growth Gap  
 
 
Non-union job 
Unionized job 
 
Part-time job 
Full-time job 
 
Industry 
Mining, quarrying and extraction 
Gas, electricity and water supply 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Retail, wholesale and distribution 
Hotels and restaurants 
Transport and communications 
Financial Services 
Other business services 
Public Administration 
Health and social services 
Education 
Other community services 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
 
Occupation 
Managerial occupations 
Professional occupations 
Associate professional and technical occupations 
Clerical occupations 
Skilled manual occupations 
Personal and protective services 
Sales occupations 
Semi-skilled manual  
Unskilled 
 
Permanent job 
Non-permanent job 
 
Workplace employs 25 or less employees 
Workplace employs more than 25 employees 
 
6.127 
(1.506) 
1.942 
(0.578) 
3.733 
(0.970) 
 
0.406 
 
 
0.018 
(0.173) 
 
0.512 
0.488 
 
0.204 
0.796 
 
 
0.017 
0.008 
0.165 
0.042 
0.152 
0.052 
0.059 
0.048 
0.098 
0.085 
0.102 
0.096 
0.070 
0.009 
 
 
0.145 
0.099 
0.116 
0.176 
0.096 
0.121 
0.084 
0.083 
0.081 
 
0.953 
0.047 
 
0.488 
0.512 
 
5.998 
(1.427) 
1.901 
(0.562) 
3.728 
(0.974) 
 
0.398 
 
 
0.019 
(0.171) 
 
0.506 
0.494 
 
0.206 
0.794 
 
 
0.020 
0.009 
0.163 
0.043 
0.152 
0.055 
0.056 
0.043 
0.089 
0.086 
0.102 
0.097 
0.075 
0.010 
 
 
0.136 
0.099 
0.115 
0.175 
0.097 
0.124 
0.086 
0.086 
0.083 
 
0.954 
0.046 
 
0.325 
0.675 
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Public sector 
Private sector 
Voluntary sector 
 
Previously Made Redundant or Dismissed 
 
Never Made Redundant or Dismissed 
 
Individual characteristics 
Men 
Women 
 
Non-European ethnic minorities 
European ethnic origin 
 
Age 
Less than 25 
25 – 34 
35 – 49 
50+ 
 
Highest educational qualification 
None 
CSE or equivalent 
GCE O level or equivalent 
GCE A level or equivalent 
Higher education qualification 
Other vocational qualification 
 
Residency 
Midlands and north of England, Scotland and Wales 
 
London, the south east and southwest of England and East 
Anglia 
 
Financial Situation 
Living Comfortably 
Doing Alright 
Just About Getting By 
Struggling 
Life Satisfaction 
Satisfaction With Pay 
Satisfaction with Job Security 
Satisfaction with Work Itself 
Satisfaction with Hours Worked 
 
 
0.291 
0.666 
0.043 
 
0.081 
 
0.919 
 
 
0.494 
0.506 
 
0.026 
0.974 
 
 
0.144 
0.235 
0.399 
0.221 
 
 
0.010 
0.036 
0.188 
0.136 
0.507 
0.033 
 
 
0.354 
 
0.646 
 
 
 
0.317 
0.419 
0.213 
0.051 
 
4.894 
5.391 
5.464 
5.230 
 
0.286 
0.671 
0.043 
 
0.130 
 
0.919 
 
 
0.511 
0.489 
 
0.023 
0.967 
 
 
0.133 
0.210 
0.410 
0.252 
 
 
0.102 
0.037 
0.188 
0.127 
0.514 
0.033 
 
 
0.446 
 
0.554 
 
 
 
0.322 
0.419 
0.210 
0.049 
 
4.911 
5.408 
5.433 
5.174 
 
N. observations  29,712 25,754 
N. unique individuals  13,779 9,356 
 
Sample – pooled unbalanced panel of employees from waves 1,2,3,4,5,7,9,11,13,15 and 17 of the British 
Household Panel Survey, column (1) weighted by cross-sectional weights, column (2) un-weighted. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of employees who are trade union activists 1991 – 2007 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Union membership density and activism as a percentage of members who are activists, 1991 – 
2007 
 
 
Figure 3. Flows into and out of trade union activism
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Table three. The determinants of union activism: marginal effects from pooled and random effects logit analyses 
 
(1) Random 
Effects Logit 
(2) Random 
Effects Logit 
(3) Random 
Effects Logit (4) Pooled Logit (5) Pooled Logit (6) Pooled Logit 
Difference between actual and expected pay 
 
0.0056*** 0.0068*** 
 
0.0230*** 0.0212*** 
  
 
(0.0016) (0.0015) 
 
(0.0064) (0.0042) 
Actual and Predicted Wage Growth Gap 
 
-0.0050*** -0.0036* 
 
-0.0239*** -0.0116*** 
  
 
(0.0017) (0.0014) 
 
(0.0064) (0.0041) 
Previously Made Redundant or Dismissed 
 
-0.0032*** -0.0019* 
 
-0.0185*** -0.0058** 
  
 
(0.0008) (0.0007) 
 
(0.0035) (0.0025) 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0005*** 0.0004** 0.0018 0.0024** 0.0013 0.0034 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0024) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0056) 
Inflation Rate -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0041 -0.0017 -0.0003 -0.0105** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0045) 
Annual Wage Growth- National Level -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0010 -0.0042*** -0.0034*** -0.0025 
  (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0019) 
Voting Preference       
Labour Supporter  0.0089*** 0.0002  0.0407*** 0.0008 
  (0.0016) (0.0004)  (0.0052) (0.0015) 
Job Satisfaction 
  
  
   Satisfaction With Pay 
 
-0.0005** -0.0017** 
 
-0.0026*** -0.0015*** 
  
 
(0.0002) (0.0005) 
 
(0.0010) (0.0004) 
Satisfaction With Job Security 
 
-0.0002 -0.0001* 
 
-0.0018** -0.0005 
  
 
(0.0002) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0008) (0.0004) 
Satisfaction With Work Itself 
 
-0.0005** -0.0003 
 
-0.0016 -0.0005 
  
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
 
(0.0010) (0.0005) 
Satisfaction with Hours Worked 
 
-0.0001 0.0001 
 
-0.0012 0.0001 
  
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
  
(0.0005) 
Financial Situation (Ref Living Comfortably) 
  
  
   Doing Alright 
 
-0.0010* -0.0001 
 
-0.0023 0.0012 
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(0.0006) (0.0005) 
 
(0.0029) (0.0014) 
Just About Getting By 
 
-0.0015** -0.0004 
 
-0.0059* 0.0003 
  
 
(0.0007) (0.0006) 
 
(0.0034) (0.0017) 
Struggling 
 
-0.0023** -0.0005 
 
-0.0101** -0.0006 
  
 
(0.0009) (0.0009) 
 
(0.0050) (0.0029) 
Control Variables 
  
  
   Part Time Job 
  
-0.0030*** 
  
-0.0108*** 
  
  
(0.0006) 
  
(0.0022) 
Active workplace union 
  
0.0210*** 
  
0.0479*** 
  
  
(0.0020) 
  
(0.0024) 
Workplace employs 25 or less employees 
  
-0.0010 
  
-0.0030* 
  
  
(0.0005) 
  
(0.0016) 
Non-permanent job 
  
-0.0031*** 
  
-0.0134*** 
  
  
(0.0006) 
  
(0.0036) 
Sector (ref. Private) 
  
  
   Public sector 
  
0.0044*** 
  
0.0093*** 
  
  
(0.0012) 
  
(0.0026) 
Voluntary sector 
  
0.0044* 
  
0.0110*** 
  
  
(0.0021) 
  
(0.0037) 
Women 
  
-0.0032*** 
  
-0.0081** 
  
  
(0.0007) 
  
(0.0017) 
Ethnic Minorities 
  
0.0039 
  
0.0097*** 
  
  
(0.0023) 
  
(0.0037) 
Age (ref. <25) 
  
  
   25 – 34 
  
0.0005 
  
0.0038 
  
  
(0.0009) 
  
(0.0026) 
35 – 49 
  
0.0035*** 
  
0.0106*** 
  
  
(0.0010) 
  
(0.0025) 
50+ 
  
0.0067*** 
  
0.0160*** 
  
  
(0.0017) 
  
(0.0029) 
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Residency 
  
  
   Midlands and north of England, Scotland and 
Wales   
0.0031*** 
  
0.0086*** 
  
(0.0006) 
  
(0.0016) 
Highest educational qualification (ref. none) 
  
  
   CSE or equivalent 
  
0.0015 
  
0.0037 
  
  
(0.0019) 
  
(0.0043) 
GCE O level or equivalent 
  
0.0002 
  
-0.0006 
  
  
(0.0010) 
  
(0.0028) 
GCE A level or equivalent 
  
-0.0003 
  
-0.0033 
  
  
(0.0010) 
  
(0.0029) 
Higher education qualification 
  
0.0020* 
  
0.0043* 
  
  
(0.0009) 
  
(0.0026) 
Other vocational qualification 
  
0.0001 
  
-0.0014 
  
  
(0.0017) 
  
(0.0047) 
Occupation (Ref- Managerial) 
  
  
   Professional occupations 
  
0.0030* 
  
0.0069** 
  
  
(0.0013) 
  
(0.0027) 
Associate professional & technical occupations 
  
0.0026* 
  
0.0069*** 
  
  
(0.0012) 
  
(0.0026) 
Clerical occupations 
  
0.0017 
  
0.0043 
  
  
(0.0011) 
  
(0.0027) 
Skilled manual occupations 
  
0.0058** 
  
0.0117*** 
  
  
(0.0021) 
  
(0.0031) 
Personal and protective services 
  
0.0012 
  
0.0024 
  
  
(0.0011) 
  
(0.0028) 
Sales occupations 
  
0.0053* 
  
0.0114** 
  
  
(0.0027) 
  
(0.0047) 
Semi-skilled manual  
  
0.0083*** 
  
0.0165*** 
  
  
(0.0025) 
  
(0.0031) 
Unskilled 
  
0.0027 
  
0.0078** 
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(0.0016) 
  
(0.0030) 
Industry (ref. Retail) 
  
  
   Mining, quarrying and extraction 
  
0.0026 
  
0.0092* 
  
  
(0.0026) 
  
(0.0051) 
Manufacturing 
  
0.0019 
  
0.0059 
  
  
(0.0015) 
  
(0.0037) 
Gas, electricity and water supply 
  
0.0077 
  
0.0223*** 
  
  
(0.0048) 
  
(0.0060) 
Construction 
  
0.0003 
  
0.0012 
  
  
(0.0018) 
  
(0.0053) 
Agriculture, Forestry And Fishing 
  
0.0015 
  
0.0069 
  
  
(0.0040) 
  
(0.0093) 
Hotels and restaurants 
  
0.0040 
  
0.0087 
  
  
(0.0034) 
  
(0.0059) 
Transport and communications 
  
0.0071* 
  
0.0143*** 
  
  
(0.0029) 
  
(0.0040) 
Financial Services 
  
0.0028 
  
0.0088* 
  
  
(0.0022) 
  
(0.0048) 
Other business services 
  
0.0037 
  
0.0091** 
  
  
(0.0023) 
  
(0.0045) 
Public Administration 
  
0.0030 
  
0.0104** 
  
  
(0.0020) 
  
(0.0044) 
Education 
  
0.0037 
  
0.0102** 
  
  
(0.0022) 
  
(0.0045) 
Health and social services 
  
0.0049* 
  
0.0117*** 
  
  
(0.0025) 
  
(0.0044) 
Other community services 
  
0.0051 
  
0.0130*** 
  
  
(0.0027) 
  
(0.0044) 
Predict Probability for Benchmark Worker 0.0696 0.0125 0.0127 0.0433 0.0333 0.0494 
Random Effect: Wald Chi2 test 72.25 98.96 817.66 
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Standard errors in parentheses. *** = p<0.001,** = p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
Additional controls, not reported for reasons of space: survey wave 
Random Effect: Probability > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    SVY: F()     16.28 10.00 12.3 
N Observations 
N Unique Individuals 
25,754 
9,356 
25,754 
9,356 
25,754 
9,356 
25,754 
9,356 
25,754 
9,356 
25,754 
9,356 
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Technical Appendix. Table A1. The characteristics of the ‘benchmark’ statistical worker against whom 
marginal effects are evaluated. 
 
 
Variable Name 
Baseline Value Used for Marginal Effect 
random effects logit 
model 
Pooled cross-sectional 
logit model 
Difference between actual and expected pay 1% 1% 
Actual and Predicted Wage Growth Gap 1% 1% 
Previously Made Redundant or Dismissed Not Previously Not Previously 
National Unemployment Rate 4% 4% 
Inflation Rate 2% 2% 
Annual Wage Growth- National Level 2% 2% 
Voting Preference 
Satisfaction With Pay 
Not Labour 
4.898086 
Not Labour 
4.9100778 
Satisfaction With Job Security 5.422987 5.405982 
Satisfaction With Work Itself 5.438421 5.427169 
Satisfaction with Hours Worked 5.17074 5.176871 
Financial Situation  Living Comfortably Living Comfortably 
Job Type (PT/FT) Full Time Full Time 
Unionized Workplace? Yes Yes 
Workplace Size More than 25 Employees More than 25 Employees 
Contract Type Permanent Permanent 
Sector Private Private 
Gender Male Male 
Ethnicity  White White 
Age Under 25 Under 25 
Residency South of England South of England 
Education  None None 
Occupation Managerial Managerial 
Industry Retail Retail 
    
